Anguilla

Authors: La Ligne Fine – Institut

Published date: September 1, 2026

Key data

Official name: Anguilla.

Status: British Overseas Territory, with a high degree of internal autonomy. The United Kingdom retains the ultimate sovereign responsibilities, particularly in terms of defence, external relations and good governance. The United Nations lists Anguilla among the Non-Self-Governing Territories monitored by the Special Committee on Decolonisation^[1].

Capital: The Valley.

Population: about 16,000 inhabitants according to the IMF in its 2026 report on the Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union; Anguilla is presented as the second smallest territory in the ECCU by population^[2].

Area: about 91 km². Anguilla is a small low-lying island in the Eastern Caribbean, supplemented by several islets and cays. Its small size is a structural constraint: a narrow domestic market, scarcity of land, high climate exposure, dependence on imports, vulnerability to external shocks.

Official language: English.

Currency: Eastern Caribbean dollar, used as part of the Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union. The Eastern Caribbean dollar is administered by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.

Political system: territorial parliamentary democracy, within the constitutional framework of a British Overseas Territory.

Head of state: the British sovereign, represented locally by a governor.

Head of government: Cora Richardson-Hodge, Prime Minister / Premier of Anguilla, designated as head of government by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade^[3].

Constitutional framework: Constitution of Anguilla of 1982, amended in particular in 1990, 2019 and 2020. The 2026 report of the UN Special Committee on Anguilla recalls that the Executive Council includes the Prime Minister, several ministers and two ex officio members (United Nations, 2026).

Economy: An island service economy, dominated by high-end tourism, financial services, construction, real estate, activities related to international residents, and increasingly, revenues associated with the national domain name « .ai ».

Recent growth: According to the IMF, Anguilla’s real growth is estimated to have slowed to 3.2% in 2025 from 5.7% in 2024, in an economy where tourism remains the main pillar but where sales of internet domains have gained importance as a source of income (International Monetary Fund, 2026).

International positioning: British Caribbean microterritory, integrated into the economic and monetary environment of the Eastern Caribbean, dependent on North American and European tourism flows, exposed to international standards of tax transparency, UK policies relating to overseas territories and climate risks.

Key vulnerabilities: dependence on tourism, exposure to hurricanes, small market size, dependence on imports, tension between financial attractiveness and fiscal transparency, institutional dependence on the UK, infrastructure fragility, cost of living, energy vulnerability.

1. Executive Summary

Anguilla is a Caribbean micro-territory whose strategic trajectory cannot be understood by conventional power, but by the management of dependence. Dependence on the United Kingdom for the constitutional framework, defence and certain external aspects. Dependence on tourism for growth. Dependence on international standards for financial reputation. Dependence on transport infrastructure for access to the territory. Dependence on imports for energy, food and essential goods. Finally, dependence on the climate, in a region exposed to hurricanes and rising environmental risks.

But Anguilla is not only vulnerable. It is also an agile territory, with a high-end tourist image, an English-speaking environment, relative political stability, a stable regional currency and the ability to take advantage of economic niches. Its recent development shows that a micro-territory can look for room for manoeuvre in intangible sectors. The most significant example is that of the national domain « .ai », which has become valuable in the age of artificial intelligence. The IMF points out that, in the Anguila economy, tourism remains central, but that domain sales have become particularly important as a source of income^[4]. This data is strategic: it shows that a tiny territory can capture a global digital rent without having a heavy technology industry.

The classic interpretation of Anguilla as a simple tourist destination is therefore insufficient. The territory is first and foremost a case of constrained micro-sovereignty. It has local institutions, an elected government, a strong political identity, a singular history of separation from Saint Kitts and Nevis and a British status that provides it with a form of institutional security. But it is not sovereign in the full sense. Its future depends in part on London’s arbitrations on the overseas territories, international pressure on offshore financial centres, the resilience of its tourism model and its ability to transform its exceptional or sectoral revenues into sustainable capacities.

Anguilla’s history is marked by a refusal to be absorbed into a regional political structure that was considered unfavourable. The break with Saint Kitts and Nevis in the 1960s, and then the subsequent formal separation, founded a local political culture attached to autonomy and the recognition of Anguila’s specificity. This memory gives the territory a stronger political identity than its small size suggests. Anguilla is not only a British tourist dependency; it is a political community that has historically defended its ability not to be governed from another island.

The contemporary challenge is less one of independence than one of sustainability. Many Caribbean micro-territories have formally gained independence. Anguilla has chosen another path: internal autonomy within the British framework. This path offers guarantees, but it also limits international sovereignty. The territory benefits from an institutional umbrella, but it remains exposed to British requirements for transparency, governance and tax compliance. The Guardian reported in 2025 that London was putting increasing pressure on several British overseas territories to set up beneficial ownership registers accessible to people with a legitimate interest, even though the British government seemed more satisfied with Anguilla’s progress than with that of other territories such as the British Virgin Islands^[5].

Economically, Anguilla remains a service economy. High-end tourism is its main driver. Its reputation is based on beaches, stability, security, luxury hotels, tourist real estate and proximity to North American markets. This specialization produces high incomes, but it exposes the territory to external shocks: recession in the issuing countries, hurricanes, rising air transport prices, pandemic, regional competition, insurance costs, land saturation. The Covid-19 crisis has shown the extreme vulnerability of island economies dependent on tourism; the recovery has confirmed their ability to bounce back, but not their immunity.

The main strategic challenge for 2026-2030 will therefore be consolidation. Anguilla must convert its advantages (high-end tourism, stability, « .ai » digital niche, financial services, UK links, regional anchoring) into structural resilience. This means investing in infrastructure, diversification, education, renewable energy, hurricane preparedness, financial transparency, administrative capacity and land management. For a territory of 16,000 inhabitants, every public decision has a systemic effect: a hotel project, a tax reform, a new air access, a constitutional change or a major storm can change the national balance.

Strategic reading: Anguilla is an incomplete but functional sovereignty. It does not have the attributes of an independent state, but it does have its own political space, an identifiable economy and a capacity for local arbitration. Its future will not depend on a classic rise in power, but on its ability to control the risks of a small, very open economy.

• Strategic historical landmarks

Anguilla’s history is that of a small territory that refused regional subordination. Its trajectory differs from that of many independent Caribbean states, as it is marked by a claim for autonomy not against the British Crown in the first place, but against a regional political association deemed dominated by St. Kitts.

Anguilla was colonized by the British in the seventeenth century. For a long time, the island remained marginal, poor, poorly endowed with resources, and less structured by large sugar plantations than other Caribbean territories. This historical marginality weighed on its trajectory: Anguilla was not a large plantation economy that later became an independent state; it is a peripheral territory that has built its identity on scarcity, migration, community ties and local autonomy.

In the twentieth century, Anguilla was administratively associated with Saint Kitts and Nevis. This union gradually became a source of tension. The Anguilla felt that they were neglected by the administration based in Saint Kitts. They contested the distribution of resources, access to public services and political representation. This frustration led to the Anguilla Revolution of 1967, when the island rejected its membership of the Associated State of Saint Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla. The movement expressed less a desire for absolute independence than a refusal to be governed by Saint Kitts.

This sequence is central to local political memory. It explains the attachment to autonomy and the distrust of institutional frameworks imposed from outside. Anguilla briefly proclaimed its independence unilaterally, but the United Kingdom intervened in 1969. The outcome was not complete independence: Anguilla remained linked to London, but its gradual separation from Saint Christopher was enacted. In 1980, Anguilla officially became a separate British territory.

This trajectory produces a paradox. In many anti-colonial movements, London is the authority to be rejected. In the case of Anguilla, London also becomes the guarantor of a separation from Saint Kitts. The British link is therefore not only a colonial legacy; it is also perceived by part of the population as a framework for the protection of local autonomy. This distinguishes Anguilla from other territories where independence has been the natural horizon for decolonization.

The 1982 Constitution, subsequently amended in 1990, 2019 and 2020, organises contemporary political functioning. The 2026 report of the UN Special Committee recalls that the territory has an Executive Council comprising the Premier, several ministers and two ex officio members^[6]. This architecture illustrates the institutional compromise: local government elected for internal affairs, governor representing the Crown for reserved functions, British supervision for certain areas.

Modern economic development is based primarily on tourism. From the second half of the twentieth century, Anguilla built an image distinct from certain more massed Caribbean destinations. The territory values high-end, tranquility, beaches, villas, resorts, security and a certain exclusivity. This strategy allows it to compensate for its small size by moving upmarket.

The financial sector and offshore services are also developing, as in several British overseas territories. But international pressure against tax evasion, money laundering and opacity is gradually forcing Anguilla to adapt its regulatory framework. The recent economic history is therefore one of standardisation: it is no longer just a question of attracting people through confidentiality or taxation, but of remaining compatible with OECD, British and European standards.

Finally, the emergence of the « .ai » domain gives Anguilla an unexpected resource. In the global digital economy, the national extension of the island is becoming associated with artificial intelligence. This digital rent is recent, potentially volatile, but very significant for such a small economy. It is a remarkable example of geo-numerical randomness: a country code assigned to a small island becomes a global asset because it corresponds to a central technological abbreviation.

Historical reading: Anguilla is a territory of refusal and adaptation. Refusal of regional domination by Saint Kitts; adaptation to the British framework; adaptation to tourism; adaptation to fiscal standards; adaptation today to a global digital niche.

• Current political structure

Anguilla is a British Overseas Territory with an elected local government. Its political system is based on a division between internal powers exercised locally and responsibilities reserved to the United Kingdom. This configuration gives the territory significant autonomy, but not complete sovereignty.

The Head of State is the British sovereign, represented by a governor. The governor retains specific responsibilities, notably in areas related to good governance, internal security, the civil service, certain financial aspects and external relations, according to the constitutional framework. The local government, led by the Prime Minister, exercises day-to-day political responsibilities.

Cora Richardson-Hodge is the head of government. Her position is confirmed by international diplomatic lists that mention her as Premier of Anguilla^[7]. She embodies a political sequence marked by several issues: constitutional reform, economic development, tourism management, financial compliance, infrastructure, diversification and use of revenues related to the « .ai » domain.

Anguilla’s party system is very different from that of a large state. Cleavages are highly personalized, territorialized and communal. The small size of society reduces the distance between elected officials, voters, businesses, families and administrations. This proximity can strengthen political accountability, but it can also promote the personalization of power, local conflicts, perceptions of favoritism and the difficulty of fully separating the public and private spheres.

The constitutional issue remains important. Anguilla is not independent, but it has a strong political identity. Constitutional debates generally focus on the balance between local and governor’s powers, financial responsibility, good governance, the role of London and the possible evolution of the status. The 2026 UN report recalls that Anguilla is still treated as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, which legally maintains the question of its self-determination^[8].

However, independence does not seem to be the dominant political horizon in the short term. For a territory of 16,000 inhabitants, complete independence would raise serious questions: diplomacy, defence, international representation, debt, climate resilience, financial regulation, administrative capacity, access to markets, external security. The British link offers institutional guarantees and international credibility, even if it involves constraints.

The contemporary political debate is rather based on a logic of reinforced autonomy. Anguilla seeks to preserve its internal decision-making capacity while benefiting from British protection. This logic is characteristic of several overseas territories: formal sovereignty is not necessarily considered more advantageous than autonomy under an institutional umbrella.

Political interpretation: Anguilla is not a passive colony. It is an autonomous territory that constantly negotiates its margin within a British framework. Its policy is based less on the conquest of independence than on the optimization of autonomy.

• Economic structure

The Anguilla economy is an extremely open service economy. It is mainly based on high-end tourism, construction, real estate, financial services, activities related to international residents and the digital revenues associated with the « .ai » domain. Its small size makes it very sensitive to variations in a few sectors.

Tourism is the historical pillar. Anguilla attracts a clientele looking for beaches, villas, high-end resorts, calm, safety and exclusivity. The territory does not seek to compete with large mass destinations in terms of volume, but in terms of quality. This strategy is consistent with its small size: very large volume tourism would quickly saturate infrastructure, land, water, waste and the coastal environment.

But this model is vulnerable. Tourism depends on source markets, particularly North America and Europe. It also depends on regional air transport, maritime connections, security image, political stability, insurance, weather and competition from other islands. A hurricane, a US recession, a pandemic, an increase in ticket costs or a health crisis can produce an immediate shock.

The IMF indicates that Anguilla’s real growth is expected to have slowed to 3.2% in 2025 from 5.7% in 2024. It points out that tourism remains the heart of the economy, but that sales of internet domains have become increasingly important as a source of income^[9]. This combination is important: Anguilla is no longer just a physical economy of beaches and hotels; it also benefits from a digital rent.

The « .ai » domain is an atypical strategic resource. Originally, it was simply the country-code top-level domain associated with Anguilla. But the global rise of artificial intelligence makes this extension extremely attractive to technology companies, start-ups, platforms and investors. For an economy of 16,000 inhabitants, the revenues related to domain names can represent a very significant budgetary contribution. The risk, however, is to consider this rent as permanent. It depends on a global technological trend, the demand for the extension, the governance of the registry, competition from other extensions, reputation and the evolution of digital practices.

Financial services is another structuring sector. Like several British overseas territories, Anguilla has developed an offshore activity. But international pressure is forcing a gradual tightening of transparency rules. The European Union has kept Anguilla on its list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes in 2026, along with other territories and states; Reuters recalls that this list exposes the jurisdictions concerned to reputational damage, increased control of financial transactions and a risk of losing certain European funding^[10]. This listing constitutes a strategic vulnerability for the territory’s image.

The OECD is also monitoring Anguilla’s progress in terms of transparency and exchange of information. The June 2026 enhanced monitoring report indicates that Anguilla has taken measures, in particular on the retention of beneficial ownership information, with a thematic inspection launched in 2025 also covering fiduciary service providers^[11]. The challenge is clear: Anguilla must remain financially attractive without being perceived as an area of opacity.

Construction and real estate are supporting tourism. Villas, resorts, second homes, hotel infrastructure and luxury projects are fuelling activity. But this sector is also creating tensions: pressure on land, the cost of housing for residents, dependence on foreign labour, vulnerability to tourism cycles and the risk of an imbalance between the luxury economy and local social needs.

Economic reading: Anguilla is efficient because it is specialised. But this specialisation is also its weakness. The territory must avoid depending simultaneously on three fragile rents: high-end tourism, offshore finance and the « .ai » domain.

• International and regional positioning

Anguilla occupies a special international position: it is not an independent state, but neither is it a simple local administration. The territory has a political identity and a government, but its external relations are framed by the United Kingdom. This situation places it at the intersection of three spaces: the British space, the Caribbean space and the international area of financial regulation.

The first anchor is British. The United Kingdom guarantees the constitutional framework, defence and part of the external representation. This link gives Anguilla credibility, security and belonging to the British Overseas Territories family. But it also exposes the territory to London’s injunctions. When the British government demands more transparency on beneficial ownership or financial compliance, Anguilla must respond, even if it affects its business model.

The second anchorage is Caribbean. Anguilla belongs to the Eastern Caribbean environment. Its currency is that of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. Its economy depends on regional flows, maritime and air transport, tourist markets, workers and regional economic standards. But Anguilla stands out from several neighbours by its non-independent status and its high-end tourist positioning.

The third anchor is North American. Anguilla’s tourism is highly dependent on visitors from the United States and Canada. This dependence makes the North American economy a major determinant of the local economy. A drop in purchasing power, a recession, a rise in interest rates or a disruption in aviation can have a rapid impact on activity.

The fourth anchor is European. Even outside the European Union, Anguilla is affected by European decisions in tax, financial and regulatory matters. The inclusion on the European list of non-cooperative jurisdictions is a direct example of this influence^[12]. The European Union does not need to be sovereign over Anguilla to influence its model: its normative power is sufficient.

Anguilla is also followed by the United Nations in the context of decolonisation. The 2026 report of the UN Special Committee maintains the territory in the category of Non-Self-Governing Territories^[13]. This gives an international legal dimension to its status, even if the local political dynamic does not seem to be oriented towards rapid independence.

International reading : Anguilla is a territory of limited sovereignty, but of multiple dependencies. Its room for manoeuvre depends on its ability to simultaneously satisfy London, international standards, tourist markets and its local population.

• Security, climate and infrastructure

Anguilla does not have an army. Its external security is the responsibility of the United Kingdom. But this does not mean that security issues are secondary. In a micro-island territory, security is less about conventional defence and more about climate resilience, infrastructure security, financial stability, cybersecurity, procurement and disaster response capacity.

The first risk is climate. Anguilla is exposed to hurricanes, tropical storms, coastal erosion, rising sea levels, droughts, water tensions and extreme events. Hurricane Irma in 2017 was a reminder of the vulnerability of small Caribbean islands. For Anguilla, a natural disaster can simultaneously affect housing, hotels, ports, the airport, electricity, water, telecommunications, public finances and the tourism image.

The second risk is infrastructural. The territory is highly dependent on its connections. Visitors must be able to arrive easily. Goods must be imported. Telecommunications must remain reliable. Electricity must be stable. Ports, ferries and air infrastructure are therefore strategic assets. In a large country, a local outage can be absorbed; in a micro-island, a major outage becomes a national one.

The third risk is energy. Anguilla depends largely on imported fuels for its electricity production and transport. This dependence exposes the territory to international prices, logistical costs and supply disruptions. The development of renewables is therefore an issue of practical sovereignty. Reducing the energy bill would improve resilience, limit vulnerability to external shocks and adapt the tourism model to environmental expectations.

The fourth risk is digital. The rent of the « .ai » domain implies a responsibility for digital governance. The more valuable this extension becomes, the more it requires solid, transparent and credible management. A cybersecurity incident, poor registry governance or a controversy over the use of domains could affect an important source of revenue.

The fifth risk is financial. Tax and financial transparency standards are becoming issues of reputational security. For an economy dependent on services and trust, reputation is an intangible infrastructure. The OECD and the European Union are therefore not only technical evaluators; their decisions change the perception of the territory among banks, investors, platforms and partners.

Security reading: Anguilla does not need an army to be exposed to strategic risks. Its main threats are climate, financial, digital, energy and infrastructure.

• Risks and vulnerabilities

The first vulnerability is dependence on tourism. Anguilla is highly exposed to tourism cycles and external shocks. The high-end market partly protects against mass tourism, but it also makes the territory dependent on an international clientele sensitive to global economic conditions.

The second vulnerability is climate-related. A single major disaster can cause massive economic losses, disrupt infrastructure and weaken public finances.

The third vulnerability is tax and reputational. Keeping Anguilla on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes creates a risk of increased image and scrutiny^[14]. Even if progress is recognised in some areas, the territory must continue to prove its compliance.

The fourth vulnerability is institutional. Anguilla has local autonomy, but remains dependent on the United Kingdom. This dependence can be protective, but it limits its room for manoeuvre on certain issues.

The fifth vulnerability is social. The tourism and real estate model can create a gap between the luxury economy and local living conditions. The cost of housing, access to skilled employment, dependence on imports and inequalities must be monitored.

The sixth vulnerability is demographic. A very small population means a limited base of administrative, technical and professional skills. The territory must train, retain and attract the necessary talent.

The seventh vulnerability is that of the « .ai » rent. This resource is precious, but potentially volatile. It depends on a global technology cycle that the territory does not control.

• Opportunities and dynamics to follow

The first opportunity is the « .ai » digital rent. Well managed, it can finance long-term investments: education, climate resilience, infrastructure, renewable energy, digital transformation, stabilization funds. If poorly managed, it risks becoming a consumed rent without transformation.

The second opportunity is sustainable high-end tourism. Anguilla can consolidate its image as an exclusive destination, but it needs to integrate sustainability, water management, clean energy, coastal protection and quality of experience more.

The third opportunity is financial compliance. Sustainably removing negative lists and increasing transparency could reposition Anguilla as a clean, specialized and reliable financial services jurisdiction.

The fourth opportunity is renewable energy. Solar, storage, energy efficiency, and microgrids can reduce reliance on imported fuels.

The fifth opportunity is education and skills. A microterritory can transform quickly if windfall revenues are invested in local skills.

The sixth opportunity is the British relationship. The link with London can be used to obtain expertise, guarantees, climate assistance, regulatory cooperation and diplomatic support.

• Points of vigilance

Track revenues related to the « .ai » domain and their budget allocation. Track tourism growth, including dependence on North American markets. Track investments in the airport, ports, and regional connections. Track Anguilla’s presence on European tax lists. Track OECD reports on transparency and information exchange. Track possible constitutional reforms. Track relationships between local government and London. Track the cost of housing and residents’ access to land. Track renewable energy policies. Track hurricane resilience plans. Track administrative capacity to manage tourism, finance, digital, and climate simultaneously.

1. Final strategic reading

Anguilla is a micro-territory of high vulnerability and agility. Its small size limits its power, but increases the possible speed of its transformations. It is difficult for the territory to change the rules of the international system, but it can specialize, adapt, capture niches and transform certain dependencies into levers.

Its future will depend on the management of three rents: tourism rent, financial rent and digital rent. The first is old, profitable, but exposed to climate and global cycles. The second is useful, but subject to increasing international pressure. The third is recent, spectacular and linked to artificial intelligence, but it remains uncertain. The challenge is not to confuse rent and strategy. A rent can finance a strategy; it does not replace it.

Anguilla must therefore use its current revenues to build sustainable capacities: climate resilience, energy, infrastructure, skills, transparency, digital, housing and administration. It is on this condition that the territory will be able to maintain its real autonomy within a framework of limited sovereignty.

Strategic conclusion: Anguilla is not a powerful player, but it is an eye-opening territory. It shows how Caribbean microterritories must navigate between tourism, taxation, climate, international standards and new digital rents. Its success will not depend on formal independence, but on its ability to transform a protected autonomy into productive resilience.

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^[1] United Nations. (2026, February 9). Anguilla: Working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/2026/2). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4104532/files/A_AC.109_2026_2-EN.pdf

^[2] International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Department. (2026). Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2026 discussion on common policies of member countries—Press release and staff report (IMF Country Report No. 26/85). International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229045049.002

^[3] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Anguilla—Heads of government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/heads-of-government/anguilla

^[4] International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Department. (2026). Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2026 discussion on common policies of member countries—Press release and staff report (IMF Country Report No. 26/85). International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229045049.002

^[5] Davies, R. (2025, July 1). British overseas territories miss final deadline to crack down on ‘dirty money’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/jul/01/british-overseas-territories-miss-final-deadline-to-crack-down-on-dirty-money

^[6] United Nations. (2026, February 9). Anguilla: Working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/2026/2). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4104532/files/A_AC.109_2026_2-EN.pdf

^[7] Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Anguilla—Heads of government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/heads-of-government/anguilla

^[8] United Nations. (2026, February 9). Anguilla: Working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/2026/2). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4104532/files/A_AC.109_2026_2-EN.pdf

^[9] International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Department. (2026). Eastern Caribbean Currency Union: 2026 discussion on common policies of member countries—Press release and staff report (IMF Country Report No. 26/85). International Monetary Fund. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229045049.002

^[10] Reuters. (2026, February 17). EU adds Turks and Caicos, Vietnam to tax havens list. https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-adds-turks-caicos-vietnam-tax-havens-list-2026-02-17/

^[11] OECD. (2026, June 19). Enhanced monitoring report on the implementation of the standard on transparency and exchange of information on request 2026 update (June). OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9ef50941-en

^[12] Council of the European Union. (2026, March 6). Council conclusions on the revised EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (C/2026/1465). Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52026XG01465

^[13] United Nations. (2026, February 9). Anguilla: Working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.109/2026/2). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4104532/files/A_AC.109_2026_2-EN.pdf

^[14] Reuters. (2026, February 17). EU adds Turks and Caicos, Vietnam to tax havens list. https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-adds-turks-caicos-vietnam-tax-havens-list-2026-02-17/