Author : Isabela MULLER

Introduction 

The development of an international regime for the protection of displaced persons is historically linked to efforts to address the human consequences of wars, political persecution, and crises that transcend national borders. After World War II, the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 established the institutional and legal foundations of an international protection system. Initially designed to address the needs of European refugees after World War II, this system was expanded by the 1967 Protocol, which removed the temporal and geographical limitations of the Convention. A regime focused on protecting the rights of those who cannot find safety within their own country was thus consolidated.

This development, however, has not eliminated a fundamental tension in migration governance: international protection depends on collective rules and commitments, but its implementation remains largely contingent on the decisions of states.  Although international law establishes specific obligations for the protection of refugees, admission into national territory, the organization of asylum systems, and the provision of resources for reception involve capacities and political choices that are often unevenly distributed. State sovereignty and international cooperation, therefore, do not necessarily operate in opposition to one another, but neither are they automatically compatible.

In recent decades, the international community has sought to expand cooperation mechanisms to address these limitations. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, adopted in 2016, recognized the shared responsibility for protecting displaced persons and supporting host countries. In 2018, this process led to the adoption of two distinct instruments: the Global Compact on Refugees, aimed at sharing responsibilities and supporting host communities, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, designed to establish a cooperative approach to the various dimensions of international migration. Although not legally binding, these instruments reflected an effort to strengthen the international regime and coordination without supplanting the authority of states (UN, 2016; UN, 2018; UNHCR, 2018).

The existence of these commitments, however, does not in and of itself ensure the effective distribution of responsibilities. Migration cooperation depends not only on the formulation of common principles, but also on the willingness of governments to fund protection, maintain pathways for admission, and respect applicable legal safeguards. When these conditions weaken, the gap between multilateral commitments and national practices becomes more evident. Migration governance then faces a contradiction: while international instruments recognize the need for cooperation, national policies may prioritize border control, restricting access to asylum, and shifting responsibilities to other territories.

In 2026, this tension manifests itself in a scenario marked simultaneously by the persistence of armed conflicts and a decline in humanitarian response capacity. According to preliminary data from UNHCR, 117.8 million people remained forcibly displaced at the end of 2025. Although this figure represents a decrease from the previous year, the agency attributed the decline, in part, to an increase in returns, many of which took place under adverse circumstances or into fragile contexts. At the same time, cuts in humanitarian funding, a reduction in resettlement opportunities, and the tightening of asylum policies reveal that the statistical decline in displacement does not necessarily correspond to an improvement in protection conditions (UNHCR, 2026).

In this context, this article examines the following question: How does the erosion of international cooperation on migration – against a backdrop of armed conflict and political polarization – shift the costs of governance onto migrants themselves and their host countries? It is argued that this process subjects displaced persons to a double squeeze. On the one hand, armed violence and conflicts increase the need for protection; on the other, restrictive political forces narrow the pathways to reception and seek to incorporate their priorities into collective rules and practices. Caught between these two pressures, the cooperation that should distribute the costs of protection loses its capacity to respond, causing formally shared responsibilities to fall disproportionately on migrants and host states.

To develop this argument, the article examines three channels through which costs are transferred: financing, through the reduction of resources allocated to humanitarian assistance; norms, based on the tensions between multilateral commitments, state sovereignty, and guarantees of protection; and externalization, through policies that shift part of the activities of control, detention, and return to third countries. The analysis seeks to demonstrate that the central issue is not merely the capacity of states to manage migration flows, but the manner in which the costs and responsibilities of such management are distributed. The phenomenon is examined through the lens of recent international trends and illustrative cases, without assuming that all states adopt the same strategies or that the erosion of cooperation produces uniform effects in all contexts.

1. The erosion of the cooperation 

At the beginning

Armed violence continues to cause large-scale displacement and increase the need for international protection. In 2025, conflicts and violence surpassed natural disasters as the leading cause of internal displacement for the first time. By the end of the year, 68.7 million people remained displaced within their own countries as a result of conflict or violence, while Sudan was home to the world’s largest internal displacement crisis, with more than 9 million people in this situation (UNHCR, 2026, p. 29). These figures demonstrate that the reduction in international response capacity is occurring in a context where conflicts continue to generate significant protection needs. The pressure on migration governance, therefore, stems not only from the scale of displacement but also from the difficulty of ensuring adequate and sustainable responses for affected populations.

At the destination

Italy illustrates how restrictive political forces, upon coming to power, seek to project their priorities beyond the national sphere and influence collective responses to migration. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s party is widely classified as part of the radical right-wing populist movement, and her government has sought to establish the Italian experience as a model for sectors of the European radical right. The migrant processing centers set up in Albania have faced legal challenges since their implementation. Nevertheless, Meloni has committed to their continued operation with the entry into force of the new European Union Pact on Migration and Asylum on June 12, 2026. In August of that same year, Italy and Denmark proposed the creation of return centers in third countries deemed safe, inspired by the Albanian model (EURONEWS, 2026a).

Domestically, the restrictive measures also affect rescue operations at sea. According to the NGO Sea-Watch, the enforcement of the 2023 Piantedosi decree resulted in the detention of 41 rescue vessels for a cumulative total of 1,075 days (SEA-WATCH, 2026). On February 11, 2026, the Italian Council of Ministers also approved a bill—subject to approval by both chambers of Parliament—that provides for the possibility of blocking the entry of vessels carrying migrants into territorial waters for up to 30 days, with the possibility of extension under the terms set forth in the bill. According to Human Rights Watch, the measure could be invoked in situations classified as involving exceptional migratory pressure, allowing for the transfer of people on board to third countries with which Italy has agreements, without clear guarantees of an individual assessment of protection needs (SUNDERLAND, 2026).

These national initiatives are unfolding in parallel with the tightening of rules at the European level. One day before the Italian Council of Ministers approved the bill, the European Parliament adopted new rules regarding the application of the “safe country” concept and the possibility of processing asylum claims outside the territory of the Union. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani interpreted the confirmation of the list of countries considered safe as an endorsement of the Italian government’s position (SUNDERLAND, 2026). This case thus highlights the attempt to align European policies with an approach that can be considered centered on control, deterrence, and return, although the proposals and measures cited have distinct legal statuses and should not be treated as if they were all already fully implemented.

In the middle 

Meanwhile, multilateral cooperation forums are facing increasing difficulties in reaching political consensus. On May 20, 2026, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Progress of the International Migration Review Forum, reaffirming the non-binding nature of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the sovereignty of states (UN, 2026). The adoption process, however, revealed greater political division: while the equivalent declaration from 2022 was approved without a vote, the 2026 declaration received 147 votes in favor, six against, and 23 abstentions (UN, 2022; UN, 2026). Although the adoption demonstrates that support for cooperation still exists, the need for a recorded vote highlights the lack of consensus surrounding the document and reaffirms the non-binding nature of the Global Compact for International Migration.

This political difficulty occurs in parallel with the reduction in protection pathways. Refugee resettlement –  mechanism for shared responsibility among countries – fell by 57% in 2025, totaling 81,800 arrivals. In the United States, the decline was 89%, following the suspension of admissions for most refugees in January of that year (UNHCR, 2026, pp. 9 and 43). The contrast between the formal reaffirmation of cooperation and the contraction of these pathways reveals a gap between multilateral commitments and the policies actually adopted by states.

Tensions also arise among European countries themselves. In August 2026, Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi called on Germany to compensate Italy for migrants brought ashore by German nongovernmental organizations (EURONEWS, 2026b). This episode illustrates how the dispute over who should assume reception responsibilities can arise even among governments that are part of the same regional cooperation framework. Taken together, these signs point to a system of migration governance in which collective commitments persist, but the distribution of responsibilities becomes more contested and avenues for protection become more restricted.

• Cost Channels

Financing

International assistance, which supports part of the humanitarian response, declined significantly in 2025. According to preliminary data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), official development assistance from countries in the Development Assistance Committee fell by 23.1% in real terms compared to the previous year, marking the largest annual decline on record. Humanitarian assistance fell by 35.8%, totaling $15.5 billion, while spending on refugees within the donor countries themselves – counted as official development assistance – amounted to $23 billion, although it also decreased by 22.1% compared to 2024. For 2026, the OECD projected a further 5.8% decline in official development assistance (OECD, 2026a; OECD, 2026b). These figures point to a reduction in available resources amid high humanitarian needs, making it more difficult to sustain protection responses over the long term.

For refugees and the countries hosting them, the consequences are very real. The High Commissioner stated that nearly 14.5 million refugees in low- and middle-income countries depend on aid to meet their basic needs and that countries that have been hosting refugees for decades are frustrated by the lack of international solidarity. He also warned that cutting aid and shifting responsibility to host countries does not constitute success (UN NEWS, 2026). This statement sums up the mechanism: the cost of protection does not disappear; it is passed on to those who host refugees.

Uganda illustrates the consequences of this cutback. The country hosts approximately 1.9 million refugees (UNHCR, 2026, p. 27). In May 2025, reduced funding led the World Food Program (WFP) to cut food assistance for 1 million refugees, leaving about 663,000 people receiving aid. In 2026, the number of beneficiaries rose again to 784,000, but more than 642,000 people in refugee settlements still face acute food insecurity at the crisis level or worse. In addition, more than 147,000 new refugees were registered in the country in 2025 (UN Uganda, 2026). In March 2026, a WFP official stated that food insecurity among refugees had more than tripled in one year (WFP, 2026). The country maintains its reception policy, even as the resources needed to sustain it remain insufficient. 

The case of Uganda highlights the gap between the responsibility to host refugees and the material capacity to ensure adequate conditions of protection. Reducing assistance does not eliminate the needs of refugees, but it does limit the resources available to meet those needs, shifting part of the cost to the host country and to the displaced persons themselves.

The norms 

The second channel for cost-sharing is regulatory. International cooperation depends not only on resources but also on rules capable of distributing responsibilities and ensuring protection. When collective commitments are not accompanied by sufficient enforcement mechanisms, protection comes to depend, to a large extent, on the political priorities of national governments.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, adopted in 2018, reflects this tension. Although it constitutes a framework for cooperation, the instrument is not legally binding and reaffirms the sovereignty of states over their migration policies. This does not render the Compact irrelevant, but it highlights the limitations of commitments whose implementation depends on the voluntary adherence of governments. Changes in national policies can undermine reception and integration policies without sufficient international mechanisms to compensate for these losses. The gap between multilateral commitments and their implementation thus constitutes a weakness in the distribution of responsibilities.

In the European Union, this tension is evident in the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been in effect since June 12, 2026. Although it establishes common procedures and a solidarity mechanism, Human Rights Watch warns of risks related to the acceleration of asylum procedures, the expansion of detention, and the transfer of asylum seekers to third countries (Human Rights Watch, 2026b). Furthermore, states may fulfill certain obligations through financial contributions or operational support, rather than by receiving people transferred from other countries. Solidarity, therefore, does not necessarily guarantee an equitable distribution of the costs of reception.

An additional gap concerns people who cross borders due to climate change. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not recognize displacement caused exclusively by climate factors as an independent ground for recognizing refugee status. This does not mean an absolute lack of protection: other legal instruments may apply in certain circumstances, including when climate-related effects are combined with persecution or violence (UNHCR, 2023; UNHCR, n.d.). The absence of a specific universal category, however, creates uncertainty regarding the conditions for admission, stay, and protection.

These examples reveal the normative dimension of the double bind. While protection needs are increasing, collective instruments coexist with broad margins for national discretion and legal gaps. For displaced persons, this can mean more procedural obstacles and less predictability regarding access to protection. The normative cost arises, therefore, when international commitments fail to ensure an effective distribution of responsibilities, leaving part of the burden on the migrants themselves and on host countries.

Outsourcing

The third channel is outsourcing, understood here as the set of policies through which states transfer part of their migration control activities, application processing, detention, or enforcement of returns outside their territory. The practice is not new, but its expansion and diversification point to a significant shift: rather than managing exclusively the arrival and stay of migrants within their borders, states seek to prevent or interrupt migration routes through agreements with transit countries and alternative destination countries.

In the United States, the expansion of deportations to third countries offers an example of this logic. Between January 2025 and March 2026, nearly 13,000 people who were neither U.S. citizens nor Mexican nationals were deported to Mexico, according to a Human Rights Watch report. These transfers included people who had no significant ties to the destination country and who subsequently faced difficulties accessing documentation, employment, assistance, and legal protection (Human Rights Watch, 2026b).

In October 2026, the organization also documented the transfer of third-country nationals from the United States to six African countries: Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eswatini, and South Sudan. Among those interviewed were individuals at risk of persecution and other serious harm in the countries to which they were sent. The report even identified cases of LGBTQI+ individuals transferred to countries that criminalize same-sex relationships, even though some had been granted protection in the United States precisely because they feared persecution in their countries of origin (Human Rights Watch, 2026c).

These cases show that externalization is not merely a matter of physically removing a person from a state’s territory. It can also separate the decision to remove someone from the obligation to ensure that the destination is actually safe. When the transfer occurs without an adequate assessment of the risks of persecution, torture, or other serious harm, deportation policy can undermine the principle of non-refoulement and access to effective procedural safeguards.

It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the outsourcing of the transfer of responsibilities itself and mere administrative cooperation between countries. The existence of agreements with third parties does not automatically imply a violation of international law. The decisive question is whether the destination country offers effective protection, whether individual risks have been assessed, and whether the person has real means to challenge the decision before being transferred. Without these guarantees, the agreement may function primarily as an instrument of territorial removal rather than as a mechanism for shared protection.

In Europe, the proposal to create return centers in third countries follows a similar logic. In August 2026, Italy and Denmark advocated for the possibility of establishing centers outside the European Union, drawing on Italy’s experience in Albania. The proposal comes alongside the implementation of the new European Pact and discussions on strengthening return procedures (Euronews, 2026a; Human Rights Watch, 2026a).

Outsourcing can also exacerbate the disparities among the states involved. Countries with greater economic and diplomatic capacity are able to negotiate agreements to prevent arrivals or carry out returns, while partner countries bear part of the administrative, political, and humanitarian costs of this strategy. Even if the transfer involves financial compensation or operational support, the question remains whether the resources are sufficient to guarantee effective protection and whether the costs are distributed proportionally.

For migrants, the consequence is a greater distance between the exercise of state control and the possibility of challenging it. A person may be transferred to a jurisdiction with which they have no ties, without adequate access to family networks, legal assistance, or integration mechanisms. Displacement does not necessarily end with deportation: it may continue in the form of forced movement, detention, irregular stay, or renewed attempts to reach a territory where it is possible to seek protection.

Outsourcing thus complements the mechanism identified in the two previous channels. Reduced funding diminishes the resources available for reception and protection; regulations may widen the scope of restrictions or leave specific needs inadequately addressed; and externalization shifts the management of people deemed undesirable by destination countries to other territories. Taken together, these processes allow states to maintain or expand their capacity for migration control without necessarily assuming an equivalent share of the costs of protection.

• Who pays? 

Migrants

For immigrants, the cost takes the form of forced return, delays, or even the loss of assistance. According to UNHCR data, by 2025 approximately 14 million people had returned to their countries of origin, and the agency itself states that most of these returns occurred under adverse circumstances in places of asylum or to fragile contexts (UNHCR, 2026, p. 43). The Afghan case is the clearest example: 1.9 million refugees returned, mostly due to policy changes in neighboring countries, and the majority of these returns were assessed as involuntary. In July 2025, the number of people leaving Iran exceeded 40,000 per day (UNHCR, 2026, p. 17). Upon arrival, the situation showed no improvement, with four out of five families reporting that they skipped at least one meal a day, and only 60% had any source of income. Another prime example is the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where 3.6 million internally displaced persons returned, many involuntarily following the forced closure of settlements (UNHCR, 2026, p. 31).

And those who remain wait. Pending asylum claims have reached nearly 9 million, and the backlog has been growing for nine consecutive years because the number of claims exceeds the number of decisions; in the United States alone, there were about 3.7 million (UNHCR, 2026, p. 40). And assistance is being scaled back: in the case of an educational center for Rohingya children in Malaysia, the report notes that funding cuts in 2025 reduced enrollment by 30% and led to the closure of one facility, leaving 150 children without access to education. 

Host States 

Host countries also bear a disproportionate share of the costs of migration governance. According to UNHCR, low- and middle-income countries host 68% of refugees, while the least developed countries receive approximately 26% of the total, despite accounting for only 1.4% of global gross domestic product (UNHCR, 2026, p. 28). The distribution of responsibility for protection thus remains far removed from the global distribution of economic resources.

Uganda illustrates the concrete effects of this asymmetry. The country hosts approximately 1.9 million refugees but faces growing difficulties in maintaining food assistance. In May 2025, the World Food Program was forced to reduce support for one million refugees, leaving about 663,000 people without assistance. Although the number of beneficiaries subsequently increased to 784,000, more than 642,000 people in the settlements face acute food insecurity at the crisis level or worse, according to data released in 2026 (UN Uganda, 2026).

The case does not demonstrate that international funding cuts are the sole cause of food insecurity in Uganda, nor that all host countries respond in the same way to reduced assistance. It does, however, highlight a structural vulnerability: when hosting capacity depends on external resources and those resources diminish, host governments and communities must cope with needs that do not disappear at the same rate.

This pressure can affect public services, local infrastructure, access to land and employment, and relations between refugees and host communities. The effects depend on economic conditions, national policies, and the administrative capacity of each country. Nevertheless, when international responsibility is replaced by an expectation that host countries will be self-sufficient, the principle of shared responsibility loses part of its distributive function. 

It is important, however, not to view low- and middle-income countries merely as passive recipients of external pressures. Their migration policies are also the result of national choices, domestic disputes, and security considerations. The case of Afghan returnees itself shows that neighboring countries may adopt restrictive measures, even when they host large refugee populations. The argument here is more limited: the reduction in international assistance occurs in a context in which these states already bear a significant share of the responsibility for hosting refugees, making it more difficult to sustain long-term protection policies.

The inequality in the distribution of costs is, therefore, simultaneously financial, institutional, and political. States with greater economic capacity are able to fund border controls, negotiate external agreements, and restrict entry routes. In contrast, countries hosting large refugee populations must maintain minimum levels of protection and services, often with insufficient resources. Migrants, in turn, face the consequences when neither level of responsibility can ensure an adequate response.

The relationship between the two levels should be framed as a plausible mechanism, rather than as an automatic causality: a reduction in international assistance can weaken reception capacity; economic and administrative difficulties can increase pressure for restrictive measures; and these measures can, in turn, reduce the options available to refugees. To fully demonstrate this sequence, cross-country comparisons, data on resource trends, and specific evidence of national policy decisions would be necessary. Nevertheless, the cases examined show that a reduction in cooperation can exacerbate existing inequalities in the distribution of responsibility for protection.

Conclusion 

The analysis reveals a pattern of erosion in international cooperation on migration, in which growing protection needs coincide with a narrowing of resources, safeguards, and pathways to reception. The concept of the “double squeeze” helps explain this dynamic: on the one hand, conflicts and violence increase the need for protection; on the other, restrictive political forces reduce access to that protection and seek to incorporate their priorities into collective rules.

The three channels analyzed demonstrate how this process plays out. In terms of funding, the reduction in humanitarian resources compromises the capacity to provide assistance and places additional pressure on host countries. At the policy level, the gap between multilateral commitments and implementation mechanisms—combined with the expansion of restrictive procedures and the existence of protection gaps—reduces the predictability of available safeguards. In the area of externalization, agreements and return centers allow states to delegate part of migration management to third parties, without the territorial transfer itself ensuring the effective protection of the people involved.

The result is an asymmetrical distribution of the costs of migration governance. Migrants bear the burden of legal uncertainty, forced returns, prolonged waiting, and the risks associated with more dangerous routes. Low- and middle-income countries, which host the majority of refugees, must maintain assistance structures despite limited resources. States with greater economic and diplomatic capacity, in turn, have more tools at their disposal to control entry and shift part of the responsibility outside their territories.

This pattern does not mean that all international cooperation is disappearing, nor that all multilateral instruments have become ineffective. The adoption of common rules, the work of UNHCR and other international organizations, and the maintenance of assistance mechanisms continue to play important roles. Nor does the existence of restrictive policies, in and of itself, demonstrate that international protection has been entirely abandoned. The argument is more specific: cooperation becomes less capable of distributing the costs of protection when its commitments are not accompanied by sufficient resources, effective guarantees, and predictable mechanisms for shared responsibility.

There are also empirical limitations to consider. Aggregate data on displacement, funding, and resettlement reveal important trends, but do not, on their own, demonstrate causal relationships between donor decisions, national policies, and forced returns. The cases of Italy, the United States, and Uganda illustrate distinct mechanisms and should not be treated as evidence of a uniform model of state behavior. Furthermore, externalization can take different legal and administrative forms, the effects of which depend on the terms of each agreement and the guarantees actually offered.

These limitations do not invalidate the argument, but they do define its scope. The pattern observed suggests that the central issue in contemporary migration governance is not merely the capacity of states to control borders, but their willingness to share responsibility for protecting people who cannot find safety in their countries of origin. When cooperation focuses on control, deterrence, and return, without ensuring adequate material and legal conditions for reception, the cost of migration management is no longer shared collectively but instead falls disproportionately on those least able to avoid it.

The challenge for multilateralism in migration, therefore, is to rebuild the relationship between sovereignty, shared responsibility, and effective protection. This requires more than simply reaffirming general commitments: it requires predictable funding, procedures that respect individual safeguards, protection mechanisms for situations not fully covered by existing instruments, and rigorous assessments of the consequences of externalization agreements. Without these conditions, cooperation may remain formally in place while its capacity to protect and share responsibilities weakens. The double bind thus reveals not the disappearance of migration governance, but a transformation of its priorities and the distribution of its costs.

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