Militarization of space
Series: Strategic Foundations
Authors: Alek UMONT
Published date: September 3, 2026
Executive Summary
The militarization of space is not a new phenomenon. The first decades of the space age were already marked by the use of satellites for intelligence, early warning, military telecommunications and, progressively, navigation. The strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has largely contributed to the development of these capabilities. What distinguishes the current period is therefore not the emergence of a military use of space, but the extent to which space services have taken on the functioning of armed forces and, at the same time, the development of means to challenge access or use of space.
Technologically advanced armies now rely on space infrastructures for functions that are directly involved in the conduct of operations: long-range communications, positioning, navigation, synchronization, observation, intelligence, surveillance, missile launch detection or situational awareness. NATO has recognized space as an operational domain since 2019 and presents these services as essential to its deterrence and defence posture[1].
This integration changes the vulnerabilities of forces. The interruption of a satellite service does not necessarily eliminate an army’s ability to fight, but it can reduce the accuracy of certain operations, slow down the flow of information, complicate the coordination of dispersed forces, or limit access to certain information. The effect depends on the mission involved, the duration of the disruption, and the alternative solutions available. It is this diversity of effects that makes it necessary not to treat « space » as a homogeneous system. The loss of a telecommunications capability, the local disruption of a navigation signal, and the neutralization of a satellite contributing to strategic warning have neither the same severity nor the same implications.
The development of counter-space capabilities is a direct response to the importance of these services. It covers a much broader set than just anti-satellite missiles. Actions likely to affect a space architecture can target the object in orbit, radio links, ground stations, computer networks or user terminals. The American doctrine published in 2025 explicitly recognizes this architecture by distinguishing between several segments — orbital, terrestrial links and infrastructures — and by integrating offensive and defensive actions conducted against these different segments into space control operations[2].
The United States has thus adopted a more directly operational conception of the space domain. The United States Space Force defines space superiority as a degree of control that allows forces to continue their operations without prohibitive interference while being able to limit adversary action. The Space Force Vector 2025 describes an institution moving from a logic essentially focused on the provision of services to an organization explicitly oriented towards conducting operations in a contested environment[3].
The American evolution is particularly advanced, but it is not an isolated case. NATO has been deepening the integration of space into its operations for several years and now considers that space data and services must be integrated into the planning of land, air, maritime and cyber operations. The work carried out in 2026 by Allied Command Transformation insists on interoperability, shared standards and the construction of an operational image integrating space data[4].
France has embarked on a similar evolution in its national framework. The Space Command, created in 2019, has strengthened its structures, surveillance capabilities and operational readiness. The national space strategy presented in November 2025 confirms the importance given to autonomous access to space, the protection of national systems and France’s ability to conduct military space operations[5][6].
The European Union is following a different trajectory because it does not have a military chain of command comparable to that of a state or NATO. However, it seeks to strengthen the protection of space services needed by its member states. The European Space Shield project, which is part of the European Defence Preparedness for 2030, aims to strengthen the protection and resilience of space assets and services by building on EU systems, national capabilities and commercial suppliers. Priorities identified include space domain awareness, anti-jamming and spoofing, secure communications and some in-orbit operations[7].
At the same time, the proliferation of commercial players is a structural change. States no longer depend exclusively on satellites designed and operated by their administrations or armed forces. Commercial observation, communication, launch or data processing services can complement sovereign capabilities. NATO adopted a commercial space strategy in February 2025 that explicitly provides for the integration of these services into its planning, exercises and operations[8].
This reliance on the market can build resilience when it multiplies the number of available vendors and solutions. It can, however, displace dependencies rather than eliminate them. A military capability can become dependent on a private constellation, a company-owned terrestrial network, or contracts with terms that were not designed for a protracted conflict. The distinction between civilian and military infrastructure also becomes more complex when the same system provides services to commercial users and armed forces.
The development of challenge capabilities must also be placed in an orbital environment that is already highly congested. The European Space Agency reports that more than 40,000 objects are now being tracked and estimates that more than 1.2 million pieces of debris are larger than one centimetre, enough to cause serious damage in a collision. The increase in the number of active satellites and debris makes it more difficult to preserve certain orbits and increases the potential consequences of destructive actions[9].
This environmental factor does not eliminate the possibility of kinetic attacks, but it does change their cost. The destruction of a satellite can generate fragments that will then threaten the systems of many actors, including those of the attacker. The means of obtaining a temporary or localized effect (jamming, cyber attacks, disruption of links, certain directed energy means) may therefore be of greater operational interest in many scenarios. Their use is also more difficult to distinguish from a competition below the threshold of open conflict.
International law provides a framework for these developments, but does not prohibit them in their entirety. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into orbit and prohibits military installations and the testing of weapons on celestial bodies. However, it does not contain a general prohibition on the military use of outer space or on all categories of anti-satellite assets[10].
Recent standard-setting efforts have therefore focused more on certain behaviours. UN General Assembly Resolution 77/41, adopted in 2022, calls on States not to carry out destructive tests of direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles. It is not a disarmament treaty and does not prohibit anti-satellite systems themselves, but it targets behaviour whose environmental consequences can have a lasting impact on all space users[11].
The militarization of outer space must therefore be analysed on the basis of the continuity of services and not solely on the basis of the presence of weapons. The States in the best position will not necessarily be those with the largest number of satellites or anti-satellite assets. Their position will also depend on their ability to identify truly critical functions, to protect the corresponding architectures, to maintain alternative solutions, to replace lost systems and to continue certain operations in a degraded space environment.
Problem
The first difficulty lies in the vocabulary. « Militarization », « weaponization », « anti-space capabilities », « space defence » and « war in space » are regularly used as if they were describing a single evolution. However, they refer to different realities. The use of satellites to support an army does not pose the same problems as the development of an anti-satellite missile; a military observation satellite is not equivalent to a system designed to neutralize another satellite; a localized jamming operation does not produce the same consequences as physical destruction in orbit.
An overly broad definition of militarization does not make it possible to identify the current transformation, since space has been used for military purposes for decades. An overly narrow definition, limited to weapons deployed in orbit, leads to an underestimation of the means actually available to allocate space capabilities. The reasoning must therefore start from the military function provided by space and then examine the means to protect or challenge it.
Space is primarily involved in the production of information. Satellite observation makes it possible to monitor military activities, assess certain positions, identify movements or support intelligence operations. These capabilities do not replace other means of collection — aircraft, drones, signals intelligence, human sources — but they can provide specific geographical coverage and regularity.
It is then used in communications. Satellite systems make it possible to establish links over very long distances, especially when terrestrial infrastructure is absent, vulnerable or insufficient. Their importance increases when forces are dispersed over several theatres or when they need to exchange large volumes of data quickly.
Positioning, navigation and synchronization services also play a key role. The American GPS, Galileo in Europe and other global constellations are not only used to locate units. Time signals contribute to the operation of many networks and space navigation can be integrated into several precision systems. The disturbances observed in the civil domain also show the sensitivity of these services to jamming and spoofing.
Early warning systems complement these functions. Satellites capable of detecting certain launches contribute to the assessment of the strategic situation and, for certain powers, to the operation of deterrence. An attack against this type of capability therefore has a different meaning from a disruption of an ordinary commercial service.
The analysis cannot therefore assess the vulnerability of a state by simply counting its satellites. It must identify which missions depend on which systems, how long an interruption can be sustained and which alternative solutions can be mobilized.
The latter issue is often overlooked. A dependency is not determined by the importance of a service in its normal functioning, but by the gap between that importance and the availability of alternatives. A force may make massive use of a space-based service while still having the means to continue operating after its disruption. Another apparently less visible function may become much more problematic because no quick alternative exists.
The current militarization is partly the result of this calculation. The more an army depends on specific services, the more an adversary has an interest in studying ways to interrupt them. This interruption can be achieved by different methods depending on the system concerned. The destruction of the orbital object is only one possibility.
The doctrine of the American Space Force provides a particularly clear description of this architecture. Counter-space operations can be conducted against the orbital, terrestrial or link segments. The doctrine also includes the electromagnetic and cyber dimensions[12].
This point significantly changes the way we think about a space conflict. A satellite can remain intact while being temporarily rendered useless. A ground station can be neutralized. Communications between the object and the ground can be jammed. Data can be intercepted or altered. A computer intrusion can target the control system. A conventional attack on a ground infrastructure can produce consequences directly comparable to those of an action taken against the satellite itself.
The boundary between space warfare and war in other domains therefore becomes irrelevant for certain operations. If a conventional strike destroys a station allowing control of several military satellites, the strategic effect concerns space while the physical action took place on the ground. Similarly, a cyberattack carried out from a terrestrial infrastructure can temporarily neutralize an orbital system without any object being attacked in space.
This distributed architecture also explains the role of cybersecurity and electronic warfare. Jamming has several operational advantages over destruction: its effect can be limited geographically, interrupted when the objective is achieved and adjusted in intensity. It generally produces fewer permanent consequences on the orbital environment. Its attribution can also be more delicate.
These characteristics increase the likelihood of actions before or outside of open warfare. The disruption of a service may be a demonstration, an intelligence operation, political pressure, or military preparation. The targeted state must therefore determine not only who is acting, but also what meaning to attribute to the action.
This uncertainty is important for strategic stability. A power may carry out an action that it considers limited while its adversary interprets it as the first phase of a broader attack. This risk increases when the target performs several functions or when its contribution to a strategic architecture is not clearly known to the adversary.
The issue of dual satellites makes this problem even more complex. A commercial system can provide services to civil administrations, companies and armed forces. A national system can perform several missions. An attack intended to produce a limited military effect can therefore affect other users and change the political assessment of the incident.
NATO doctrine reflects this difficulty by avoiding setting an automatic threshold for the application of Article 5. The Alliance considers that an attack towards, from or in outer space may lead to the invocation of collective defence, but indicates that this decision would depend on the circumstances of each case[13].
This position leaves the Alliance room for decision. However, it does not resolve the question of thresholds. Between temporary interference and the destruction of a system contributing to strategic warning, there is a continuum of actions whose consequences will have to be assessed politically.
The central problem of the militarization of space is therefore to be found in this combination of dependence, diversity of means of contestation and uncertainty about the thresholds. The more space functions become necessary for the conduct of operations, the more important their protection becomes; the more important they become, the more interesting they are for an adversary; the more the means of achieving them become more diverse, the more difficult it becomes to define in advance the conditions for a response.
However, it would be excessive to infer from this that outer space was destined to become a theatre of permanent destruction. The orbital environment imposed particular constraints, and States with the greatest space capabilities also had much to lose from widespread degradation of that environment. The proliferation of non-destructive means also offered options for producing a military effect without creating the irreversible consequences of fragmentation in orbit.
The strategic problem therefore lies more in the increase in the contestability of services than in a mechanical race to destroy satellites.
- Structural context
The increase in the number of objects and the transformation of the orbital environment
The space environment has changed scale over the last decade. The increase in launches, the development of large constellations and the multiplication of commercial players have greatly increased the number of active satellites. The European Space Agency now considers orbital congestion to be a long-term safety and sustainability problem.
Its Space Environment Report 2025 lists about 40,000 tracked objects and estimates that more than 1.2 million pieces of debris are larger than one centimetre. Objects of this size can cause catastrophic damage due to orbital speeds[14]. Statistics updated by ESA in June 2026 confirm the continued increase in the number of tracked objects and satellites in orbit[15].
This development has directly strategic consequences. The first concerns knowledge of the space environment. To protect a satellite or interpret a manoeuvre, it is necessary to be able to follow other objects, estimate their trajectories and distinguish between normal activity and unusual behaviour. Space surveillance is therefore no longer only necessary to avoid collisions. It is becoming essential for the assessment of adverse intentions and the attribution of certain actions.
The second consequence concerns proximity operations. Technologies that allow a satellite to reach another object, inspect it, resupply it or possibly repair it are of obvious commercial and civilian interest. They also have a military dimension since similar capabilities can be used to monitor an adversary system or physically intervene in the vicinity.
It is not possible to automatically infer hostile intent from technical capability. This is precisely what makes monitoring and understanding behaviors so important. Two satellites can come together for entirely different reasons; interpretation will depend on the context, the trajectory, the nature of the objects, and the relationship between the actors involved.
The third consequence is debris. A destructive attack does not only result in the loss of the targeted satellite. It can permanently modify the environment in which many other aircraft operate. The individual interest of the attacker then comes into tension with the collective interest in preserving the use of certain orbits.
UN General Assembly Resolution 77/41 is directly in line with this concern by calling on States to renounce destructive testing of direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles[16].
The adoption of such a resolution does not deprive States of their anti-satellite capabilities and does not address the entire problem of space weapons. It does, however, show that specific behaviour can be identified as particularly dangerous because of its lasting effects on the orbital environment.
Integration of space services into military operations
The second structural evolution is operational. Space systems are now involved at several levels of the conduct of operations. This integration cannot be reduced to a general « technological dependence »; it must be broken down according to the functions actually performed.
Satellite communications respond to a problem of distance. They make it possible to link forces and command centers without depending solely on continuous land infrastructure. Their importance is particularly strong for naval, air or expeditionary operations.
Observation provides another category of effects. Satellites can acquire optical, radar or electromagnetic data over large areas. However, their value depends on the revisit time, the resolution, the weather conditions for some sensors, the speed of processing and the ability to transmit the information to the user.
Navigation and synchronization are a third function. GNSS signals allow for precise positioning, but their strategic value goes beyond geolocation alone. They participate in the operation of synchronized systems and can be integrated into various military capabilities.
Early warning complements these services. Space systems capable of detecting certain missile launches occupy a special place because they contribute directly to strategic decision-making. NATO brings these different functions together in its approach to the space domain and emphasizes their role in communication, navigation and intelligence[17].
The actual level of vulnerability, however, depends on how these functions are combined. An army with an alternative navigation capability or a robust terrestrial communications network can absorb a disturbance for longer than a force whose architecture assumes continuous availability of space service.
This issue must therefore be integrated into the design of military systems. An architecture built solely to maximize performance when all services are functioning normally can be fragile in a contested environment.
The growing importance of the commercial sector
Commercial development has profoundly changed the space economy. Companies can now orbit and operate constellations on a scale that was previously reserved for the most important government programs.
Armed forces can benefit from this in a number of ways: through the purchase of communications, access to observational data, the use of launch services, the use of processing capabilities or the purchase of information on the space environment.
NATO has formally recognised this development since the adoption of its Commercial Space Strategy in February 2025. The document calls for allied capabilities and complementary commercial services to be used together to increase the safety, efficiency and resilience of space operations[18].
The operational interest is obvious. A commercial constellation with a large number of satellites can provide a replacement capacity or a volume of data that a national military program could not produce on its own. The government can also benefit from a higher rate of innovation than some public procurement cycles. Commercial integration, however, creates several problems.
The first is crisis readiness. Military needs can evolve much faster than the commitments under an ordinary commercial contract. The conditions of access, customer priorities and corporate responsibility must therefore be defined in advance.
The second is concentration. A service provided by a single company can create a significant dependency even if the physical architecture includes thousands of satellites. Resilience depends not only on the number of objects, but also on the number of actors capable of providing a comparable function.
The third concerns the status of infrastructure. A system used by an army can also serve civilian customers or several states. An attack on this infrastructure could therefore produce political and economic consequences far beyond the immediate military objective.
The military institutionalization of the domain
The creation of specialized military structures confirms that the integration of space is not temporary. In the United States, the Space Force became a separate military branch in 2019. Its 2025 doctrine explicitly organizes force readiness around space control, the provision of capabilities to other forces, and access to space.
The Space Force Vector 2025 goes further by describing the transformation of an organization once thought of primarily as a service provider into a force oriented towards waging war in a contested field.
France also created its Space Command in 2019. Its role covers surveillance, preparation for operations, asset protection and the development of a dedicated operational culture.
At the level of the Atlantic Alliance, space has been integrated into the planning structures and the space centre established in Ramstein. The 2026 work shows that the objective is now to circulate space data in the chains of command of other domains, and not to maintain a separate treatment of space.
This institutionalization has lasting effects: the creation of doctrines, the training of specialized personnel, the financing of programs, the organization of exercises and the construction of an appropriate chain of command. Even if the geopolitical context were to improve, these structures would probably continue to exist because space services would remain essential to operations.
- Power relations
The comparison between space powers must distinguish several dimensions. Owning a large number of satellites is not enough to have a full military space power. It is also necessary to be able to launch them, control them, process data, monitor the orbital environment, protect ground infrastructure and replace lost capabilities. Means of opposing challenges must also be integrated into the analysis.
United States: industrial depth and operational dependence
The United States has the most developed system because it combines specialized military capabilities, a very large commercial industry, a strong launch capability and a long-standing integration of space into operations.
Their advantage is therefore multidimensional. Satellites support communications, intelligence, navigation, warning and several command functions. Commercial companies provide a large volume of complementary services and capabilities at the same time.
This situation explains the priority given to space superiority in recent doctrinal documents. The Space Force believes that the US Joint Force can no longer assume that space capabilities will remain available regardless of adverse action[19].
The American response consists of strengthening both the means of spatial control and the resilience of architectures. These two dimensions are complementary. Offensive and defensive means can reduce the adversary’s ability to act; distribution, commercial capabilities and reconstitution reduce the effect of an attack when it succeeds.
This last dimension is important. A strategy based solely on the physical protection of the most important satellites would be very costly and probably insufficient. Some systems will remain vulnerable. The United States is therefore seeking to spread certain functions over more platforms and to maintain several sources of service.
The commercial sector strongly reinforces this approach, but it also introduces a problem of governance. A company can have a major strategic capacity without the state directly controlling all its decisions. The US authorities must therefore contractually and legally organise the availability of these services in the event of a crisis.
China: Catching up on capacity and challenging the American advantage
China has rapidly developed its entire space sector. It has its own navigation, observation and communication systems, significant launch capabilities and specialized military programs.
Its interest in counter-space capabilities is part of this rise in power. The strategic logic is directly linked to the functioning of American forces. The United States derives a significant part of its advantage from the ability to collect, process and distribute information quickly over vast theaters. Several elements of this chain use space assets.
China therefore has a clear interest in being able to disrupt certain functions in the event of a conflict. This capability does not necessarily require the systematic destruction of American satellites. The means of electronic warfare, cyber or intervention against terrestrial infrastructure can target specific functions and produce a temporary effect.
The progression of Chinese capabilities nevertheless modifies its own calculation. The more China uses its satellites for its armed forces, its economy and its civilian infrastructure, the more vulnerable it itself becomes to a challenge to the domain. This development creates more common interests around the preservation of the orbital environment without eliminating military rivalry.
The Sino-American relationship could thus evolve into a situation in which each power has significant space capabilities and means to disrupt those of the other. Such a situation does not automatically produce stability similar to nuclear deterrence. The diversity of the means that can be used, their reversibility and the difficulty of defining common thresholds make the calculation much less predictable.
Russia: Disruptive Capacity and Asymmetric Strategy
Russia has a long experience in space and specialized resources, but its economic ecosystem is less extensive than those of the United States or China. This difference makes it particularly interesting to use resources capable of producing effects that are disproportionate to the resources committed.
Electronic warfare belongs to this category. A terrestrial jamming system can disrupt a satellite service locally without requiring the construction of a competing constellation. Cyber capabilities follow a similar logic when they target control or processing infrastructures.
Russia also retains experience in the anti-satellite field and certain orbital operations. The strategic interest of these means lies less in their ability to « control space » as a whole than in the possibility of imposing costs or reducing an adversary’s advantage on an ad hoc basis.
This logic reveals a fundamental asymmetry of the space domain. Building a complete communication or intelligence architecture requires very significant investments. Degrading one of its functions locally can require much fewer resources. The powers that depend most on these systems must therefore invest in resilience in order to reduce the profitability of the attack.
Europe: numerous capabilities without a unified military architecture
European states collectively have a significant space base. Galileo provides an autonomous navigation and synchronization capability; Copernicus provides observation data; several states operate their own military satellites; European industry controls a significant part of the value chain.
The weakness lies in the fragmentation of responsibilities and resources. National capacities remain organised according to the priorities of each State, while the Union’s programmes respond to a different form of governance. ESA, which is not a military organisation, occupies yet another place in this whole.
The European Space Shield seeks precisely to improve coherence between these different levels. The 2025 European document identifies gaps in space domain awareness, protection against jamming and spoofing as well as in-orbit operations and services[20].
The European challenge lies less in the construction of a direct equivalent of the American Space Force than in the ability to guarantee essential services to the Member States and their forces. This distinction is important because the Union’s competences in terms of defence remain different from those of a State.
An effective European architecture will therefore have to combine EU systems, national military capabilities, agreements between states and, where necessary, commercial suppliers.
France: Autonomy of Appreciation and Cooperation
France has a range of resources at its disposal that enable it to play a special role in Europe: space industry, sovereign military capabilities, a specialised command system and participation in the main European and allied cooperation. The national space strategy presented in 2025 places autonomous access to space, the protection of systems and the improvement of military capabilities among its priorities[21].
However, France cannot reproduce the full depth of the American system on its own. The strategic choice must therefore focus on the functions whose national mastery is necessary for autonomy of decision-making and those that can be obtained in a European, allied or commercial framework.
Monitoring and autonomous assessment of the spatial situation play an important role in this respect. A state that is entirely dependent on a partner to identify and characterise action against its systems has its political decision-making capacity reduced. Having its own resources does not require all the data to be produced alone, but guarantees the possibility of comparing information and developing an independent analysis.
- Interests at stake
The militarization of space produces partially conflicting interests. The major powers want to preserve their own systems, maintain a usable orbital environment, and retain the ability to affect adversary infrastructure if a conflict so requires. These goals are not incompatible in all cases. A state can support a ban on debris-generating destructive testing while developing cyber or electronic warfare capabilities against space systems. It can defend the general freedom of access to space while preparing for the temporary neutralization of an adversarial military service.
This distinction explains why space diplomacy is making easier progress on certain practices than on the general idea of disarmament.
Preserve essential functions
For the United States, the priority is to ensure the continuity of the services on which its forces depend. This requirement goes beyond the individual protection of certain satellites. It presupposes being able to maintain the function even if several components are lost. Redundancy then becomes an operational issue. An observation capability can be provided by several public and commercial satellites; a communication can use several networks; a navigation service can be supplemented by alternative means. This organization does not make the whole invulnerable. It increases the number of actions necessary to cause a lasting interruption and therefore reduces the interest of a limited attack.
China is gradually pursuing the same goal for its own systems. The expansion of its space infrastructure increases the importance of its protection and changes the relationship between its offensive and defensive interests.
Retain the ability to disrupt the opponent
No major military power can ignore the possibility of reducing the effectiveness of an adversary by affecting its space systems. The question is more about the preferred means and the circumstances of use than about the existence of this option.
Kinetic destruction offers a definite material effect but exposes it to several costs. It can produce debris, provoke a significant political reaction and accelerate escalation. Jamming or cyber operations may provide a more limited effect but be more easily reversible.
The diversification of resources therefore makes it possible to adapt the action to the desired level of conflict. However, this gradation complicates stability. A reversible action can be used more easily precisely because it appears less serious. The increased frequency of these operations can gradually change the accepted behaviour and create more incidents.
Preserving the orbital environment
States with many satellites have a particular interest in limiting the production of debris. ESA statistics show that the environment is already congested enough that the growth in the number of objects becomes a sustainability problem[22].
This common interest should not be overestimated. It does not eliminate rivalries, but it does create an area in which the consequences of individual action can be broad enough to justify a common rule. Resolution 77/41 is an example of such an approach. It refers to direct-ascent destructive tests because their consequences go beyond the duel between the State conducting the test and a hypothetical target[23].
Securing relations with commercial operators
States also have an interest in ensuring that private capabilities remain available in the event of a crisis. This requires treating the relationship with companies as a component of military readiness and not as a mere procurement policy. NATO recognises this need in its space commercial strategy, which emphasises cooperation with industry and the integration of suppliers into operational needs[24].
However, companies have their own constraints. They must protect their infrastructure, comply with national legal frameworks, serve international customers and manage the risk that their participation in a military operation exposes them to adverse measures.
This divergence of interests must be anticipated. A government cannot assume that a commercial service will be available during a war simply because it is available in peacetime.
- Dynamics of evolution
The progression of reversible means
Competition should continue to favour means of producing temporary or localised effects. Their interest lies in the possibility of modulating action and avoiding certain consequences of physical destruction.
Jamming is particularly representative. It can prevent the reception of a signal in a defined area without directly affecting the satellite. Its effect ceases when the jamming emission stops, even though the operational consequences during the disturbance can be significant.
Cyber operations have different characteristics but also offer several levels of action: espionage, access preparation, data alteration, interruption of services or takeover of certain infrastructures. The dual and interconnected nature of space systems increases the number of potential entry points.
These means will not remove kinetic weapons. They expand the choice available and therefore make contestation more frequent outside of a major conflict.
The distribution of architectures
The second trend is the proliferation of platforms. A function spread across a large number of satellites is more difficult to suppress by a limited attack than a function concentrated on a handful of platforms.
However, this approach has limitations. A constellation can be distributed in orbit but depend on a small number of ground infrastructures. A cyber attack against a centralized system can then have a much broader effect than an action against an individual satellite. Resilience must therefore concern the entire architecture. Control centers, networks, stations, software and terminals must be included in the planning.
Launch as a reconstitution capability
A third development concerns the speed of replacement. States that can quickly return a capability to orbit reduce the duration of an attack. NATO is already working on this issue through multinational initiatives to improve allied launch access[25].
However, this capability requires more than a launcher. It is necessary to have a satellite or a payload available, a ground infrastructure ready to integrate it and procedures fast enough to allow its use. Reconstitution thus becomes an industrial and logistical question as much as a space question.
Multi-domain integration
Space operations will be increasingly integrated into the overall planning of military campaigns. NATO is now insisting on the need to move away from space as mere external support[26].
This integration also changes the way in which an attack is responded. An action against a satellite does not necessarily imply a response in space. The instruments available can be diplomatic, economic, cyber or military depending on the perpetrator, the effect and the context. This possibility of cross-responses contributes to deterrence, but it also increases the adversary’s uncertainty about the consequences of an action.
European consolidation
The European Union is likely to seek to deepen the integration of its civilian and dual programmes into defence preparedness. The European Space Shield is one of the most visible manifestations of this development[27].
The success of this policy, however, will depend on its ability to define concrete responsibilities. The juxtaposition of programmes is not enough to create a resilient military architecture. It is necessary to determine how information flows, which services are prioritised, which capacities can be mobilised during a crisis and how the national, European and allied levels are articulated.
- Recommendations
The first priority is to identify precisely the space services on which each military mission depends. This mapping must go beyond the list of satellites and include control infrastructures, networks, suppliers and terminals. It must also specify the time for which an interruption can be sustained.
This method allows for prioritization of investments. Not all functions require the same level of protection. Some can be replaced quickly; others require permanent redundancy.
The second priority concerns operation in degraded environments. Forces must be able to continue part of their operations when certain space services are unavailable or less precise. This requires alternative equipment but also specific procedures and exercises.
The objective is not to give up the advantages of space. It is to prevent a limited disturbance from producing a disproportionate effect because forces have never been trained to operate otherwise.
The third priority is the diversification of architectures. States must avoid single points of failure, whether orbital, terrestrial or commercial. Having multiple satellites does not solve the problem if they all depend on the same control centre or supplier.
The fourth priority relates to the commercial sector. Private services that could become essential during a crisis must be integrated into pre-conflict exercises and procedures. Conditions of availability, infrastructure security and priorities between users must be contractually clarified.
The fifth concerns knowledge of the space domain. States must have sufficient capacity to detect unusual behaviour, characterise incidents and support political attribution. For the European powers, this requirement justifies the development of common instruments but also the maintenance of national capabilities allowing for independent assessment.
The sixth priority is reconstruction. The availability of launch assets, replacement satellites, and standardized interfaces must be integrated into defence policies. The central issue is the time needed to restore a function after it has been lost.
The seventh concerns the protection of the ground segments. A space policy focused on objects in orbit would leave many vulnerabilities intact. Cybersecurity, physical protection of stations, energy redundancy and diversity of networks must be integrated at the same level of planning.
The eighth priority concerns international norms. A blanket ban on the militarization of outer space seems unrealistic given the degree of integration already achieved. Diplomatic efforts, on the other hand, can focus on the behaviours that produce the greatest risks: destructive tests that generate debris, dangerous outreach operations, and failure to notify certain activities or actions that could lead to strategic misinterpretation.
The ninth priority concerns Europe. The development of the European Space Shield must be assessed on the basis of the actual availability of services in crisis situations rather than on the basis of the number of programmes announced. Coordination with NATO and national capabilities must be organised in a sufficiently precise manner to avoid unnecessary duplication and gaps in accountability.
The tenth concerns France. Functions directly related to autonomy of assessment and decision-making must remain a priority. European and allied cooperation can provide depth, but it must not replace the capabilities needed to independently characterise a situation and maintain the services considered essential to national missions.
- Strategic implications
The militarization of outer space should be seen as a lasting consequence of the integration of space services with military functions. It therefore does not depend solely on the current level of great Power tensions. Even in a less conflictual international context, militaries would continue to use space communications, navigation, observation and warning because these capabilities directly enhance their effectiveness.
The competition is now about the availability of these services in an environment where the adversary is likely to seek to disrupt them. Peacetime performance is no longer enough to assess the quality of an architecture.
A system that is highly capable but concentrated around a small number of platforms, stations, or vendors can present a significant vulnerability. Conversely, a less optimized architecture with multiple service sources, alternative modes of operation, and rapid replacement capability may have superior military value in a protracted conflict.
This development should change procurement policies. The search for maximum performance on each platform must be weighed against the needs of mass, redundancy and renewal. Military space programmes, which are traditionally expensive and developed over long cycles, will not disappear, especially for missions requiring highly specialised sensors. However, they will have to coexist with more numerous and more easily replaceable architectures.
The role of the commercial sector reinforces this transformation. Companies can provide mass and speed, but the State must prevent their integration from introducing dependencies that are impossible to control in times of crisis. The challenge is therefore not to choose between public sovereignty and the market, but to distribute functions according to their degree of sensitivity.
Some capabilities justify direct state control. Others can be provided in a commercial framework if several alternatives exist and if the conditions of access are sufficiently guaranteed. Still others can be pooled between allies.
This approach also makes it possible to clarify the concept of space sovereignty. A State does not need to nationally own every satellite, each launcher and each station in order to maintain a decision-making capacity. On the other hand, it must be aware of the dependencies likely to limit its action and have alternatives for the functions whose interruption would have major consequences.
For France, this distinction is particularly important. The retention of sovereign observation, communication and situational awareness capabilities must be linked to European systems and allied systems. Cooperation increases resilience when it provides additional solutions; it creates vulnerability when it becomes the only way to access an essential function.
The European Union faces a similar problem on a different scale. It has significant space infrastructure and an industrial base, but does not directly control all the military capabilities of its Member States. Its most useful role may therefore be to provide common services, fund certain capabilities, promote interoperability and reduce identified dependencies in areas where isolated national action is insufficient.
NATO responds to yet another logic. It is based mainly on the capabilities made available by the Allies and must therefore ensure their integration. The recognition of space as an operational domain and the work carried out since 2019 are precisely aimed at ensuring that national space capabilities can effectively support collective operations.
The second major issue is that of stability. The multiplication of counter-space means does not automatically lead to their massive use, but it increases the number of options available in a crisis. Some of these options have a relatively low threshold of use because they are reversible or localized.
For example, one-off jamming can be used to meet a limited operational need without requiring a decision comparable to that of a satellite destruction. Cyber operations also offer a range of effects that allow the intensity of the action to be adapted.
This flexibility is militarily attractive but politically difficult to control. The more graduated the means, the more intermediate levels there are between ordinary activity and major attack. Doctrines must therefore include the possibility that an adversary will gradually test the limits without crossing an obvious threshold.
Attribution then becomes central. A credible response requires being able to sufficiently characterize the action and its author. This requirement reinforces the importance of knowledge of the space domain, signals intelligence, cybersecurity and information sharing between partners.
Systems related to strategic warning deserve specific attention. An action against a conventional intelligence capability and an attack on a system involved in the detection of a missile launch should not be evaluated in the same way. The latter can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the reaction capacity of a nuclear power and provoke a much faster response. Stability therefore presupposes a certain hierarchy of systems. Not all space assets are of equal importance and not all present the same risk of escalation when attacked.
This reality should also guide international discussions. Seeking to ban all military space capabilities indiscriminately seems incompatible with the current environment and the uses already established. Priority can be given to behaviours that produce the most difficult consequences to control. Debris-generating destructive tests are an obvious case. They degrade an environment used by third parties and can create risks for a very long time. Resolution 77/41 responds directly to this logic.
Proximity operations are another area where more transparency may be needed. It would be neither realistic nor desirable to ban orbital rendezvous technologies, given their civilian and commercial applications. Rules of conduct can, however, reduce the risk that a manoeuvre will be interpreted as an attempted attack.
The legal challenge will therefore probably be less to create an absolute boundary between peaceful use and military use than to regulate the practices presenting the greatest risk of damage or miscalculation.
The third issue concerns the physical environment. Militarization is taking place in a space already weakened by the accumulation of debris. Defence policies cannot therefore treat orbital sustainability as a separate subject.
The multiplication of platforms can improve military resilience but at the same time increase congestion. States will have to integrate end-of-life management, collision risks and manoeuvring capacity into their military and commercial architectures. ESA already considers that current mitigation practices are not sufficient to guarantee long-term sustainability.
A military space policy that would greatly increase the number of satellites without integrating these constraints could gradually degrade the environment whose use it seeks to guarantee. The last implication concerns the measurement of power.
Traditional indicators (number of satellites, annual launches, space budget) are still useful, but they are no longer sufficient to determine the robustness of a player in a confrontational situation.
A strategic assessment must include at least six criteria: diversity of available services, environmental monitoring capability, protection of land infrastructure, number of alternatives, ability to replace lost assets, and ability of forces to operate temporarily with degraded services. These criteria can significantly modify comparisons between powers.
A state with a large space fleet but low launch capacity or a highly centralized ground segment may have significant vulnerabilities. Another with fewer sovereign systems but a diversified network of partnerships and commercial services may benefit from greater continuity. The analysis of space power must therefore focus on the architecture and not only on the inventory.
Conclusion
The militarization of space is the result of a process that has been underway for several decades, but which has changed dimension with the integration of space services into military operations and civilian infrastructure. Space is no longer just an additional means of improving certain missions. Several important functions of the conduct of operations are now organized around the availability of space systems.
This evolution explains the development of specialised military organisations, the recognition of space as an operational domain by NATO, the doctrinal transformation of the American Space Force and the rise in power of the French Space Command. It also explains why the European Union is now seeking to protect space services useful for defence more directly.
The capabilities to challenge these services are themselves diversified. A counter-space operation can target the orbital object, but also the ground segment, links or digital systems. Physical destruction is therefore only part of the possible scenarios.
This diversity makes it likely that space services will be more frequently conflicted without necessarily implying an increase in in-orbit destruction. Jamming, spoofing, cyber operations and certain local actions offer more graduated means and can be used in situations where a kinetic attack would be politically or militarily disproportionate.
The orbital environment also imposes a constraint specific to this domain. The debris produced by destruction does not remain under the control of the attacker and can threaten the systems of many actors. This externality reinforces the interest of measures limiting debris-generating actions and explains the progression of a normative approach focused on certain behaviors rather than on the general prohibition of militarization.
The main strategic challenge now lies in the continuity of functions. States must determine which space capabilities are really needed, how long their interruption can be sustained and what alternatives can be mobilized to replace them.
This approach requires the inclusion of ground segments, digital networks, commercial infrastructure and launch capabilities in space defence policy. Protecting only satellites would not make it possible to secure the entire service.
It also requires the preparation of forces for degraded conditions. Maintaining an operational capability when certain space services become unavailable reduces the military value of an attack and improves decision-making capacity during a crisis.
Resilience is therefore becoming a central criterion of space power, but it must be understood in a concrete way: redundancy of systems, diversification of suppliers, alternative capacity, protection of the ground segment, monitoring of the environment and speed of recovery.
For the United States, the challenge is to protect a very important space advantage while reducing the vulnerability created by its deep integration into operations. For China, it is a question of both developing its own capabilities and having means that could reduce the American advantage. For Russia, asymmetric disruption capabilities can produce significant effects without reproducing the full industrial depth of the two leading powers.
For Europe, the main problem is coherence between numerous but dispersed capabilities. It must be possible to combine European systems, national military assets and commercial capabilities in a sufficiently organised way to ensure the availability of essential services. The European Space Shield can contribute to this evolution provided that issues of liability, interoperability and operational continuity are addressed at the same level as physical investments.
For France, the priority is to retain an autonomous capacity for assessment and functions directly linked to freedom of decision-making, while using European, allied and commercial cooperation to have a depth that the national scale does not allow to produce alone.
At the same time, the international framework will have to continue to evolve. The Outer Space Treaty remains the legal basis for the use of outer space:
However, it was not designed to deal in detail with all the cyber, electromagnetic, co-orbital and commercial resources that structure competition today. Measures targeting certain dangerous behaviours, the prevention of the deliberate production of debris and the establishment of transparency mechanisms therefore appear to be more realistic ways than a general ban on military uses.
The militarization of space must ultimately be neither dramatized as the certain announcement of a generalized war in orbit, nor minimized as a simple extension of old practices. The important evolution is due to the combination of three phenomena: armed forces are using more space services, the means of disrupting these services are multiplying, and the architectures concerned are increasingly mixing sovereign, allied and commercial capabilities.
This combination changes the conditions under which States prepare and conduct their operations. It increases the importance of space infrastructure without guaranteeing its availability. It therefore obliges the Powers to design their forces taking into account not only what space allows them to do, but also how they will continue to act when some of these capabilities are challenged.
It is on this point that an increasing share of the balance of space power will be played out: not only in the accumulation of satellites or anti-satellite means, but in the ability to maintain services that are sufficiently reliable, diversified and reconstitutable so that an enemy attack does not produce the desired strategic effect.
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